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Abstract
This study examines the internal control disclosures 
mandated for Chinese cross-listed companies in 2011. These 
were the first Chinese companies required to comply with 
the Basic Standards of Enterprise Internal Control. The study 
documents the level of compliance with the requirements, 
analyses the nature of the internal control weaknesses, and 
examines the quality of disclosures. The study also examines 
differences in characteristics between firms that report 
internal weaknesses and those that do not. Using descriptive 
statistics this study found a high degree of compliance from 
Chinese cross-listed companies in disclosing internal control 
information in accordance with the regulations. However, 
the analysis shows that there is some inconsistency in the 
application of the requirements, especially with regard 
to disclosures relating to internal control deficiencies, 
identification criteria and improving internal controls. The 
disclosures lack detail as to the number and nature of 
internal control weaknesses and often only provide generic 
statements on corrective measures. Firms with internal 
control weaknesses were less likely to have a Big 4 auditor. 
This study contributes to the research literature in respect of 
the compliance with disclosure standards for internal control 
weaknesses in China and the quality of internal control 
reporting of Chinese cross-listing companies.
Keywords: Internal control; Internal control weaknesses 
disclosure; Chinese cross listed companies.
Introduction
In the United States the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 2002 requires 
listed companies to disclose internal control deficiencies and to 
provide an internal control self-assessment report assured by 
the external auditor. China’s equivalent regulatory requirement 
is the Basic Standards for Enterprises Internal Control issued 
in 2008 (hereafter referred to as the Basic Standards) by the 
Chinese Ministry of Finance (MOF). The objective of the Basic 
Standards is to strengthen internal controls of businesses 
in order to promote sustainable development, improve risk 
management and avoid disruption to markets resulting from 
financial scandals (MOF, 2008). Specific guidelines to help 
achieve the Basic Standards were issued in 2010 under the 
title The Enterprise Internal Control Supporting Guidelines 
(hereinafter referred to as Supporting Guidelines). These 
guidelines were first to be applied by companies cross-listed 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 
1, 2011.
 This study examines the application of the Chinese 
internal control regulations by the cross-listed companies. 
The study assesses how well the companies complied with 
the guidelines and identifies the nature and the quality of 
disclosures reporting internal control deficiencies. The paper 
also investigates characteristics of firms with internal control 
weaknesses. 
 The remainder of the study is structured as follows: 
The first section describes the development of the internal 
control regulatory requirements. This is followed by a review of 
the literature on the disclosure of internal control weaknesses. 
The following sections describe the research questions, the 
sample selected, the research method employed and data 
analysis. The final sections discuss the findings and conclude 
the study.
Background 
Background to Internal Control Guidelines 
An effective internal control system is fundamental for a 
business to achieve its objectives relating to effective and 
efficient operations, business continuity and compliance with 
2laws and regulations (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission, 2013). The importance of internal 
control is recognized by the Chinese MOF when it states 
that the Basic Standards are issued to “promote sustainable 
development of enterprises, maintain the socialist market 
economic order and the public interest” (MOF, 2008). 
 In 2006, prior to the Basic Standards being issued, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange issued internal control guidelines 
for listed companies (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2006). In 
the following year the guidelines were published by the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2006). 
The introduction of these guidelines meant that some internal 
control information was being disclosed to investors of Chinese 
listed public companies. However, Fang and Sun (2007) state 
that the disclosure of internal control information by Chinese 
listed companies was largely a formality with no substantive 
content with the vast majority of Shanghai-listed companies 
not complying with the disclosure guidelines.
 In 2008, the Chinese MOF and other authorities: 
the Securities Regulatory Commission, National Audit Office, 
Banking Regulatory Committee and Insurance Regulatory 
Committee, issued the Basic Standards. The Basic Standards 
provide an internal control framework comprising the control 
environment, risk evaluation, control activities, information and 
communication, and control monitoring. The Basic Standards 
were first made mandatory for cross-listed companies from 
January 2011 and for all other listed companies from 2012. 
 The Basic Standards require listed companies to 
prepare a self-evaluation report on the effectiveness of their 
internal controls and have an auditor give an opinion on 
this assessment. The Basic Standards are supported by the 
Supporting Guidelines issued in 2010. 
 The Guidelines comprise three sets of implementation 
guidance: 
Application Guidelines
This regulation identifies eighteen business areas to develop 
internal control systems. The areas range from organisational 
structure and procurement activities to financial reporting. A 
complete list of the business areas is provided in the Appendix. 
Evaluation Guidelines
The guidelines provide a framework for assessing the 
effectiveness of internal controls. Guidance is given on internal 
control procedures, identifying criteria for internal control 
deficiencies and specifying the contents of the internal control 
reports. The internal control report, as a minimum must include: 
1. An authenticity statement by the board of directors;
2. An overview of the internal control environment;
3. The basis of internal control evaluation;
4. The scope of internal control evaluation;
5. The procedures and methods of internal control evaluation;
6. Recognition of internal control deficiencies;
7. Disclosures on how internal control deficiencies are to be 
rectified and corrective actions to be taken when there is 
a material deficiency; and
8. A conclusion on the effectiveness of internal controls.
According to the Evaluation Guidelines, internal control 
deficiencies include either design or operational 
deficiencies. A design deficiency is mainly at the entity 
level and an operational deficiency mainly exists at an 
activity level. Internal control deficiencies are classified 
as material, significant, or insignificant based on their 
economic impact on a business. 
Audit Guidelines
These are guidelines for the auditing firms setting out their 
responsibilities and the audit standards for the assurance 
engagement. 
 
Literature Review
The literature on internal control reporting is wide-ranging (see 
for example Schneider, Gramling, Hermanson and Ye (2009) 
which provides an overview of the literature and the research 
strands). Many research studies relate to the implementation of 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, of 2002 which requires 
senior managers and auditors to report on the effectiveness of 
internal control for financial reporting. 
 Our focus is on the disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Kinney (2007) 
provide a conceptual model for the disclosure internal control 
weaknesses (hereafter ACK model). The model identifies three 
elements: (1) the risk of the existence of an internal control 
weakness, (2) the detection of an internal control weakness, 
and (3) the disclosure of an internal control weakness. 
 Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) argue that management’s 
incentive to disclose an internal control weakness is a trade-off 
between the benefits of detecting and disclosing a weakness 
against the costs of disclosing the weakness. The benefits of 
reporting internal control weaknesses relate to transparency 
and reputation in the capital markets and cost savings in audit 
fees (Bedard, Graham, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2007). The costs of 
disclosure include compliance costs, the potential loss of repu-
tation for not providing reliable financial reports and potential 
litigation risks arising from reporting weaknesses. 
 Each of the three elements in the AKC model have been 
the subject of prior research. For element (1), research studies 
have investigated firm factors associated with the increased 
likelihood of internal control weaknesses. The findings show 
3that smaller firms and less profitable firms are more likely to 
have internal control deficiencies because they have limited 
resources to invest in and monitor internal control systems 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Doyle, 
Ge & McVay, 2007; Ji, Lu & Qu, 2013). Other factors associated 
with the increased likelihood of internal control weaknesses 
include firm growth which puts pressure on internal control 
systems and processes resulting from firm growth (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007), complexity of operations 
and major organisational changes such as restructures, mergers 
and acquisitions (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Ji et al. 2013). 
 In reference to element 2 of the ACK model, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2007) argue that Big 4 auditors have reputations 
to protect and are motivated to conduct high quality reviews 
of internal controls and make SURE that firms disclose internal 
control weaknesses. Big 4 firms have the resources to invest in 
systems, processes and training to produce high quality audits. 
However, in the United States Big 4 auditors dominate the 
supply of audit services whereas in China the concentration 
of the Big 4 is not as high although it is growing (Li, Song 
and Wong, 2008). The lack of Big 4 dominance is attributed 
to the lack of demand for high quality audits (DeFond, Wong 
and Li, 1999) as Chinese firms are unlikely to identify material 
weaknesses because of concentrated ownership by the state 
(Piotroski, 2014). 
 For element 3 in the ACK model, Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2007) argue that United States firms with a high 
institutional ownership face greater monitoring pressure 
from these owners as they have the power and influence to 
make changes. In the Chinese context there is significant state 
ownership and control of listed companies. Consequently, the 
demand for corporate transparency is low as concentrated 
ownership by the state and state control over appointments 
of key executives means that information can be accessed 
privately (Piotroski and Wong, 2012). 
 They also argue that the risk of restatements and legal 
actions are key drivers for managers to identify and disclose 
internal control weaknesses. However, restatement and 
litigation risks are not so relevant in the Chinese environment 
while state ownership of a number of Chinese listed firms has 
resulted in a large number of politicians and ex-bureaucrats 
serving as senior executives and board members. Such types 
of board members may be more motivated in extending 
their political connections and building their reputations 
instead if monitoring firm performance (Xiao et al. 2004). The 
business relationships and political connections form part of 
a corporate culture which reduces the external demand for 
high quality information for decision making and stewardship 
purposes (Piotroski and Wong, 2012). The quality of earnings of 
politically connected companies is lower compared with other 
companies. In addition firms with political connections do 
not appear to suffer financial consequences as a result of the 
opacity of accounting information disclosures (Chaney, Faccio 
and Parsley, 2011). 
Research Questions
In this study we analyse how well Chinese cross-listed 
companies complied with the internal control regulations and 
the nature of the internal control weaknesses disclosed. We 
evaluate the quality of the internal control disclosures and 
examine the factors associated with the existence of internal 
control weaknesses. The research questions are:
1. How well did cross-listed companies apply the internal 
control regulations?
2. What types of internal control weaknesses are disclosed?
3. What is the quality of disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses?
4. What firm characteristics are associated with the existence 
of internal control weaknesses? 
Sample and Research Method 
This study examines the internal control disclosures of 67 
cross-listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges at the time the internal control regulations were 
first introduced for cross listed companies on January 1, 2011. 
All these companies were cross-listed on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange with the exception of one company that was cross-
listed on the Singapore stock exchange. Nine companies were 
also listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  
 The 2011 annual reports for the 67 companies were 
downloaded from the website http://www.cninfo.com.cn/. 
The internal control reports for each of the companies were 
reviewed and each section of the report analysed to determine 
if the guidelines had been met and to assess the quality of 
disclosures. 
 All 67 companies disclosed their annual financial 
reports, internal control evaluation reports and internal control 
audit reports by 30 April 2012. All but one of the 67 companies 
received unqualified opinions on their internal control audit 
reports. 
Findings
Table 1 shows an analysis of the companies by industry. 
The companies cover nine of thirteen industry categories 
specified by the Chinese securities regulations. They include 
mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction, transportation, 
information technology, finance and insurance, real estate, 
and social services. The majority of companies are involved 
in manufacturing (40.3%), transportation (17.9%), finance and 
insurance (16.4%) and mining (10.4%). There are 27 companies 
4operating in the manufacturing industry with 27 companies 
producing mechanical equipment and metals and non-metals. 
Table 2, Panel A categorises the companies by the size of 
revenue. The cross listed companies are very large with all but 
three generating total revenue of more than ￥1 billion. The 
total revenue generated in 2011 by the 67 companies is RMB 
￥12,133 billion, representing about a quarter of China’s GDP 
of the same year. 
 The firms are profitable with an average return of 
9.27% (see Table 2, Panel B). State ownership is high with an 
average shareholding in the sample of 46% with a maximum 
shareholding of 86%. A total of 12 accounting firms audited 
the internal control reports of the 67 cross listed companies. 
The Big 4 accounting firms dominated, auditing 46 (69%) of 
the companies with PWC auditing 16 of these. The remaining 
21 (31%) of companies, were audited by China domestic 
accounting firms.
Compliance with Evaluation Guidelines 
The Evaluation Guidelines list seven elements to be included 
in the Internal Control Evaluation Report. Table 3 lists the 
number of companies which completed each of the seven 
elements – “Yes” indicates that the company complied with the 
section while “not disclosed” indicates non-compliance. 
 The Authenticity Statement requires the Board of 
Directors to confirm that they are responsible for establishing 
and maintaining an effective system of internal control and 
the truthfulness of the information disclosed. All 67 companies 
provided the statements with 35 companies using a standard 
“Board Statement”. 
 All the companies provided an overview of the 
internal control environment and the name of the company 
unit responsible for internal control matters. In many cases 
companies have established an internal control committee 
reporting to the board of directors. 
 Fifty two (77.6% of total) companies provide a section 
which identifies the business areas (refer to the Appendix) 
that are included in the evaluation of the internal control 
system. Eight companies did not have a separate section but 
disclosed the required information in sections in other areas of 
the report such as in ‘overall information’, ‘evaluation contents’, 
‘specific implementation’ or listed them in an appendix. Seven 
companies did not comply with the Internal Control Evaluation 
Guidelines. 
 According to the Supporting Guidelines, an internal 
control evaluation process should include a plan and an 
Industry No. % No. %
Mining 7 10.4
Manufacturing 27 40.3
Food and beverage
Paper making and printing
Petrochemical
Metal and nonmetal 
Mechanical equipment
Pharmacy
1 1.5
1 1.5
2 3.0
7 10.4
13 19.4
3 4.5
Electricity 3 4.5
Construction 3 4.5
Transportation 12  17.9
Railway transportation
Highway transportation
Water transportation
Air transportation
Supporting and auxiliary 
1 1.5
4 6.0
3 4.5
3 4.5
1 1.5
Information Technology 2 3.0
Finance and Insurance 11 16.4
Banking
Insurance
8 11.8
3 4.5
Real Estate 1 1.5
Social Services 1 1.5
Total  67 100.0
Table 1. Industry Distribution
Total Revenue No.  %
More than 10 billion Yuan 50 74.6
1 billion-10 billion Yuan 14 20.9
Less than 1 billion Yuan 3  4.5
Total 67 100.0
Table 2. Total Revenue of the 67 Cross Listed Companies
Panel A. Total Revenue (n=67)
M
ean
M
edian
Std dev
M
axim
um
M
inim
um
Profitability 9.27 9.70 14.34 29.17 -55.88
State Ownership 45.97 48.20 19.29 86.37 0.00
Auditor 0.69 1.00 0.47 1.00 0.00
Profitability is the return on average equity, State Ownership is the proportion of 
shares held by the state, Auditor is 1 if a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Table 2. Total Revenue of the 67 Cross Listed Companies
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics (n= 67)
5evaluation working group. On-site testing is required to 
identify control deficiencies with the results summarised and 
evaluated with an overall assessment documented in the 
evaluation report. Evaluation methods are to be integrated 
and can include individual interviews, questionnaires, walk-
throughs, field inspections, sampling, and comparative analysis. 
Fifty-nine of the sixty-seven companies (88.1 % of the total) 
disclosed their internal control evaluation procedures and 
methods. The methods most commonly used were interviews 
and sampling. 
 Table 3 shows that 49 out of the 67 companies (73.2% 
of total) disclosed internal control deficiencies. The remaining 
18 companies had no internal control weaknesses simply 
stating that according to the company standard, combined 
with daily supervision and special supervision, they did not find 
material defects during the reporting period. The percentage 
of companies with weaknesses is high in comparison to studies 
in the United States where the percentage of firms with 
weaknesses is much lower. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. (2007) use a sample beginning with 585 firms (the number 
is later reduced to 326 firms) with weaknesses and a control 
sample of firms not reporting weaknesses of 4,484 firms. Ji et 
al. (2013) document the percentage of firms with weakness 
averaged 55% and is decreasing overtime. 
 The severity of internal control deficiencies are 
classified as material, significant or insignificant. Only one 
company, Xinhua Pharmaceutical, had a material deficiency; 
two companies: Jiangxi Copper and China Shipping Container 
Lines had significant deficiencies (see text box 1. on the 
following page).
 The remaining 46 companies with insignificant 
deficiencies described them vaguely referring to defects 
in systems, processes, and procedures. Very few companies 
provided actions to eliminate the internal control deficiencies. 
However, companies that did disclose corrective measures 
lacked detail and used generic statements such as “adjusting 
staff positions”, “amending systems” and “business process 
reengineering”. There was little evidence of a detailed 
corrective plan to fix an internal control deficiency.
 According to Supporting Guidelines, the effectiveness 
of internal controls has to be clearly described in the internal 
control evaluation report and a conclusion on the overall 
effectiveness of the internal control systems made by the 
board of directors. All the companies, except for Xinhua 
Pharmaceutical, concluded that the internal control system 
was effective. There were 57 companies which had a dedicated 
section for “internal control effectiveness conclusions.” 
Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses 
The quality of disclosures of the internal control weaknesses 
was evaluated. Four categories of disclosure were applied: 
superficial, quantitative, descriptive, and detailed. A disclosure 
category is described as superficial when a company reports 
the existence of internal control deficiencies but not the 
number or their severity. When a company only discloses the 
number of deficiencies the disclosure is rated quantitative or 
if only the severity of the weakness is reported but without 
the number of weaknesses it is labelled descriptive. If both 
the number of weaknesses and their severity are disclosed, we 
Compliance No. %
Authenticity Statement
Yes 67 100
Not disclosed 0 0
Overview description of  
Internal Control
67 100
Yes 62 92.5
Not disclosed 5  7.5
Evaluation Guidelines
67 100
Yes 63 94.0
Not disclosed 4  6.0
Evaluation Scope
67 100
In a separate 
section 52 77.6
Not in a separate 
section 8 11.9
Not disclosed 7 10.5
Evaluation Procedures & 
Methods
67 100
Yes 59 88.1
Not disclosed 8 11.9
Internal Control 
Deficiencies
67 100
Material 
Deficiencies 1 1.5
Significant 
Deficiencies 2 3.0
Insignificant 
Deficiencies 46   68.7
Total Deficiencies 49 73.2
No deficiencies 
disclosed 18 26.8
Effectiveness Conclusions
67 100
Yes 66 98.5
No 1  1.5
67 100.0
Table 3. Compliance with Elements of the Internal Control Evaluation 
Report
6Text Box 1. The following is an extract translated from the Internal Control Evaluation Report of 
Xinhua Pharmaceutical.
Extract 1: Material Deficiency - Xinhua Pharmaceutical
According to the standards above, combined with results of daily supervision and project supervision, during our evaluation we found a material 
deficiency in the reporting period that the customer lines of credit had become too large, causing significant losses for a subsidiary, Shandong 
Xinhua Pharmaceutical Medical Trading Ltd (hereinafter referred to as the MTL). The internal control system of the MTL lacks a clear policy 
on provision of multilateral credits. The MTL’s Lu Zhong Branch, industrial department and Commercial Department gave credit to the same 
customers, which led to an increase in the amount of credit provided. The policy of the MTL is that lines of credit cannot be greater than the 
customer’s registered capital. Some customers have been given credit which exceeds the registered capital. The material deficiency caused the 
company to have accounts receivable to Shandong Xin Kang Qi Pharmaceutical Ltd (SDXKQ) of ￥60,730,000. SDXKQ is experiencing financial 
difficulties, which may cause the MTL to suffer even more serious losses.
Two companies reported the existence of significant deficiencies. Jiangxi Copper reports the existence of seven major deficiencies but fails to 
disclose details as shown in Extract 2. 
Extract 2: Significant Deficiency – Jiangxi Copper
According to the above criteria, combined with the daily supervision and special supervision, we found that there are 1,017 deficiencies during 
the reporting period, including seven significant deficiencies, and no material deficiency.
Similarly, in Extract 3, China Shipping Container Lines reports one significant deficiency without any information on the nature of the defect.
Extract 3: Significant Deficiency – China Shipping Container Lines
According to the above criteria, there are six internal control deficiencies during the report period. Among them, one is a significant deficiency, 
the other five are insignificant deficiencies.
Text Box 2. Disclosure Quality Categories 
Extract 1: Hisense Kelon: Superficial 
In accordance with the above standards, combined with the daily supervision and special supervision situation, we found that during the 
reporting period there are no material defects or significant deficiencies. There are still insignificant internal control deficiencies in some control 
processes.
Extract 2: Jiangxi Copper: Quantitative 
According to the above criteria, combined with the daily supervision and special supervision, we found that there are 1,017 deficiencies during 
the reporting period, including seven significant deficiencies, and no material deficiencies.
Extract 3: Guangzhou Pharmaceutical: Description
During the reporting period, the company’s internal control has obtained certain results, but the overall planning of human resources, 
information system emergency response and system recovery plans, regular check on the quality of outsourcing work remain to be strengthened. 
Extract 4: Chenming: Detailed
In accordance with the above standards, combined with the daily supervision and special supervision, we find three internal control deficiencies 
during the reporting period which are all identified as insignificant deficiencies:
 1. Subsidiary Wuhan Chenming did not record one purchase on time in January.
 2. Some of the delivery notes in subsidiary Qihe Chenming have not been stamped with a special seal for sales office delivery. 
 3. There was no notice form in a thick slurry pump equipment transfer inside subsidiary Wuhan Chenming in September.
7define the disclosure ‘detailed’. Extracts 1 to 4 give an example 
of each disclosure category translated from the Internal Control 
Evaluation Report (see text box 2. on the previous page).
 Table 4 summarises the disclosure quality results. The 
majority (51%) of the disclosures are superficial lacking any 
depth of explanation. Only six companies (12.2%) provided 
detailed disclosures.
Fifteen companies gave descriptions of their internal control 
deficiencies (disclosure categories descriptive and detailed) 
and disclosed 66 internal control deficiencies with 42 
(62.7%) entity-level deficiencies and 25 (37.3%) activity-level 
deficiencies. The list of deficiencies are categorised into entity 
or activity level deficiencies in Table 5.
 Deficiencies in the control environment are the most 
prominent problem, accounting for 13 out of the 42 entity level 
deficiencies, followed by monitoring and control activities. 
In terms of activity-level deficiencies, internal controls over 
purchase and sale activities are the most prevalent areas of 
weakness. 
Firm Characteristics and Internal Control 
Deficiencies
In further analysis we investigate differences in the 
characteristics of firms that report internal control deficiencies. 
We adapt the variables from Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and 
include firm characteristics that may result in weaknesses of 
firm size, profitability, complexity and growth. For incentives to 
report and disclose internal control weaknesses we adapt the 
variables to include Big 4 auditor, state ownership and political 
connections. Finally we include two corporate governance 
factors: independent chair and board independence as Hoitash, 
Hoitash and Bedard (2009) find that firms with strong boards 
(a composite of board qualities including size, independence 
and frequency of meetings) and audit committee members 
with more accounting and supervisory experience are less 
likely to have internal control weaknesses. 
 Table 6 shows the firm characteristics of the 49 firms 
Disclosure Quality No %
Superficial 25 51.0
Quantitative 9 18.4
Descriptive 9 18.4
Detailed 6 12.2
Total 49 100.0
Table 4. Disclosure Quality of Internal Control Deficiencies 
(n=49)
No of Companies No of ICDs %
Entity Level
Control environment 11 13 19.4
Risk assessment 4 4 6.0
Control activities 8 8 11.9
Information 
communications 2 2 3.0
Monitoring 8 10 14.9
ITGC 5 5 7.5
Subtotal 42 62.7
Activity Level  
Purchases 7 7 10.4
Revenue 7 7 10.4
Inventory 2 2 3.0
Non-current assets 5 5 7.5
Investments 2 2 3.0
Liabilities 1 1 1.5
Financial instrument 1 1 1.5
Subtotal 25 37.3
Total 67 100.0
Table 5. Internal Control Deficiencies (ICDs) 
With ICWs 
(n=49)
No ICWs 
(n=18)
Mean Mean p-value M-W*
Size 10.40 10.41 0.99 0.92
Profitability 9.19 9.48 0.94 0.65
Complexity 3.76 3.56 0.68 0.93
Growth 15.28 19.63 0.40 0.59
Acquisitions 0.93 0.06 0.40 0.28
State ownership 45.81 46.41 0.94
Political connections 0.69 0.83 0.26
Auditor 0.63 0.83 0.12
Independent chair 0.78 0.83 0.61
Board Independence 38.19 35.81 0.33
*Mann-Whitney test
Size is the book value of shareholder’s equity (logged) as at 31 December 2011, 
Profitability is the return on average equity, Complexity is the number of operating 
segments, Growth is the percentage change in sales from the prior year, Acquisitions 
is the market value of the firms aggregate acquisitions scaled by the firm’s book 
value as at 31 December 2011, Political connections equals 1 if the chairperson of 
the board of directors is or was the representative of National People’s Congress, 
government official or military officer, 0 otherwise; Board chair is coded 1 if the 
chairperson and chief executive officer positions are not held by one person, 0 
otherwise; Board independence is the ratio of independent directors to the total 
number of board members, State ownership is the percentage of shares owned by 
the state. Auditors is a binary variable, 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditor 
and 0 otherwise. 
Table 6. Companies With and Without Internal Control Weaknesses
8with internal control deficiencies and the 18 companies with 
no deficiencies. In line with prior research, firms with internal 
control deficiencies are smaller and less profitable compared 
with other firms. Firms with deficiencies have on average more 
complex operations and greater acquisition activity compared 
with those firms that do not, which is also consistent with prior 
research. In terms of the factors relating to the propensity 
for firms to disclose weaknesses, firms that disclose internal 
control weaknesses have lower state ownership and less 
political connections which is in line with expectations. Firms 
with internal control weakness also have a higher percentage 
of board chairs which are not independent. However, the mean/
median differences between the two sets of companies are not 
significant as shown by the t and Mann-Whitney tests. The 
exception is Big 4 auditors where companies with internal 
control deficiencies are less likely to have a Big 4 auditor. 
 However, contrary to prior research firms with internal 
control deficiencies have lower growth rates and more 
independent boards but the differences between firms with 
and without deficiencies is not significant. 
Discussion of Findings
Compliance with the internal control regulations for Chinese 
cross-listed companies in 2011 is generally positive. The study 
shows that 59 companies met or basically met the Internal 
Control Basic Standard and its Supporting Guidelines, while 
eight did not cover the deficiencies and rectification of internal 
controls problems.
 While compliance was high there are issues around 
the quality of information disclosed. The quality of disclosure 
of internal control deficiencies was superficial with very 
brief disclosures and little explanation of the nature of the 
deficiencies and remedies to correct them. 
 The Supporting Guidelines specify the disclosure 
areas, however, there is no set report format used by companies. 
The lack of consistent structure of the reports made it difficult 
to identify the relevant information and compare with other 
companies. There appears to be a need for further regulation 
to standardise the format of the internal control reports. 
 Companies with internal control weaknesses had 
characteristics that differed from the other companies 
consistent with prior research. However, due to our small 
sample none of the characteristics was significantly different 
except for Big 4 firms – 63% of firms with internal control 
deficiencies were audited by Big 4 compared with 83% for 
firms without deficiencies. This result may be explained by the 
fact that Big 4 firms may focus on less risky clients – those that 
are larger and more profitable.  Further research is required to 
assess this trend given that this is a small sample consisting of 
the companies that first implemented the guidelines. 
Conclusion
The Chinese government introduced regulations requiring 
listed companies to disclose management’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of the internal controls of the firm together with 
an auditor’s opinion. This study examines four aspects of the 
application of the regulations for cross-listed companies, the 
first group of companies required to implement the regulations. 
We examine (1) compliance with the regulations, (2) the nature 
of the internal control deficiencies, (3) the quality of disclosures 
in the internal control report, and (4) the characteristic of cross 
listed firms reporting internal control weaknesses.
 Our analysis shows that Chinese companies have 
complied with the legal form of the regulations providing 
the necessary disclosures. A high proportion of companies 
(73% of total) disclosed internal control deficiencies. However, 
the quality of the disclosures around the deficiencies is poor 
especially in relation to discussing the nature of the internal 
control deficiencies and the plans and processes in place to 
eliminate them. Improvements may occur in the future as firms 
familarise themselves with applying the regulations. However 
there are features of the Chinese business environment, such as 
a lack of demand for high quality reporting, that may mitigate 
an improvement in the quality of disclosures in the future. This 
is an area of future research. 
 The study finds that firms with internal control 
weakness are less likely to have a Big 4 auditor. Other 
characteristics of firms with deficiencies were not statistically 
different from other firms. Further work can be done in this 
area to assess the demand for high-quality internal control 
evaluation reports.  
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Appendix. 
China SOX – Aspects of Internal Control According to Internal Control Application Guidance
Features Description
Organizational Structure
• Ensure that decision-making, execution and supervision are separate and form adequate checks and balances. 
• Conduct an overall evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the design and operation of its organization on a 
regular basis.
Development Strategy
• Set up a strategy committee to be in charge of the management of development strategies and formulation of 
a development strategy proposal, which will be implemented after adoption upon deliberation by the board of 
directors and approval at the shareholders' meeting. 
Human Resources • Formulate annual plans on human resource needs and evaluate its execution on a regular basis.
Social Responsibilities
• Establish stringent work safety management systems, rigorous product quality control and inspection systems. 
• Diligently perform energy conservation and emission reduction responsibilities. 
• Establish a scientific employee remuneration system and incentive mechanism. 
• Ensure the entitlement of staff members to rest and leave days.
Corporate Culture
• Actively cultivate a corporate culture and a corporate culture assessment system which focuses on whether the 
directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management personnel have performed their duties in corporate 
cultural building and whether all employees identify with the enterprise's core values.
Fund-related Activities
• Based on its fund-raising goals and planning, draft fund-raising programs in light of the annual overall budget, 
specify the purposes, Amount and structure of the funds to be raised and the fund-raising methods, and make 
sufficient estimates of the fund raising costs and potential risks.
Procurement Activities • Put procurement operations under centralized management, and avoid procurement from too many suppliers or decentralized procurement.
Asset Management
• Adopt advanced inventory management technologies and methods and standardize inventory management 
processes. 
• Establish inventory management post accountability system.
Sales
• Strengthen market research and promptly adjust sales strategies according to market changes. 
• Strengthen the management or bad debts or accounts receivable. 
• Where the accounts receivables cannot be recovered in whole or in part, the enterprise should find out the reasons, 
clarify the responsibilities, and handle the issues in strict compliance with the examination and approval procedures 
and pursuant to China’s uniform accounting standards.
Research and 
Development
• Establish a research achievement protection system, and strengthen the management of patents, non-patented 
technologies, trade secrets, as well as various kind or confidential drawings, programs and data formed during the 
R&D process.
• Establish a R & D activity assessment system to enhance the comprehensive assessment of project initiation and 
research, and other process.
Engineering Projects • Designate a special department to manage engineering projects on a centralized basis. • Select contractors and supervision entities based on merits for its engineering projects through open bidding.
Guarantee
• Designate relevant departments to be responsible for guarantee operations, conduct credit investigation and risk 
assessment of applicants, and issue written reports on assessment results.
• Establish a guarantee accountability system, and strictly hold accountable the departments and personnel that made 
major errors in guarantee decision-making, fail to go through the collective examination and approval process, or fail 
to manage guarantee operations as required.
Business Outsourcing
• Establish and improve the business outsourcing management systems, specifying the scope, manner, conditions, 
procedures and implementation or business outsourcing, make clear the duties and authority of relevant 
departments and positions, and reinforce the monitoring of the entire outsourcing process.
Financial Reporting
• Hold financial analysis meetings on a regular basis, and make full use of the com comprehensive information 
reflected in the financial reports to conduct a thorough analysis of the operation and management situation and the 
existing problems of the enterprise, and constantly improve its operation and management level.
Comprehensive 
Budgeting
• Establish a budgeting management committee to perform the budgeting. Duties of comprehensive budgeting 
management.
• Prepare an annual comprehensive budget adhering to its development strategies and annual production and 
operation plan by taking into consideration economic policies, market conditions and other factors during the budget 
period.
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Contract Management
• Designate a centralized contract management department; specify the procedures and requirements for contract 
drafting, examination and approval, performance and aspects, conduct regular inspection and evaluation.
• Establish a contract performance assessment system, analyse and assess the overall situation of contract 
performance and the specific situation of the performance of major contracts at least once at the end of each year.
Internal Informal 
Communication
• Formulate a rigorous internal reporting process. Make full use of communication information technology, reinforce 
the integration and sharing of internal reporting information, and include internal reports into its unified information 
platform, so as to build a scientific internal reporting network.
• Make effective use of internal reports in risk assessment, accurately identify and systemically analyse the internal 
and external risks in its production and operation activities, and determine the strategies to tackle such risks, so as to 
achieve effective control of risks.
Information Systems • Designate a department to manage the building of information systems on a centralized basis.• Strengthen the management of critical information equipment such as the servers.
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